I am lecturer in philosophy at the University of Bristol. Over the past few years, I have been investigating the foundations and applications of epistemic utility theory. Epistemic utility theory aims to provide rigorous, decision-theoretic justifications for norms governing rational belief. It proceeds in two stages. Firstly, it pins down what is that makes one's beliefs epistemically valuable at a world, and proposes "epistemic utility functions" that measure this sort of value. Secondly, it uses the machinery of decision theory to show that certain epistemic norms are a better means to the end of epistemic value than others. Some of my work in epistemic utility theory focuses on foundational issues, e.g., sorting out why we should measure epistemic utility using "strictly proper scoring rules." Other work focuses on applications, e.g., using epistemic utility theory to help elucidate the nature of probabilistic knowledge, or to shed light on our epistemic reasons for adopting imprecise credences.